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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amici are law professors (listed in Addendum A) who have taught, studied,
written about, and have expertise in the Constitution, constitutional history, and in
particular, the structure and requisites of American federalism.1 They take no
position on the wisdom of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (a
question on which their views diverge). Nonetheless, they have a profound interest
in and expertise on the legal issue this Court is called upon to decide—whether the
Act is within Congress’s powers. On that question they are of one mind: The
provision is plainly constitutional.
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Having experienced the inadequacy of the Articles of Confederation, the
Constitution’s Framers clearly understood that the national government needed
authority sufficient “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union,
and also in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the
harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual
legislation.” 2 Records of the Federal Convention 21 (Farrand ed., 1911). To that
end, the Constitution granted the national government broad enumerated powers—
____________________________
1

Pursuant to F.R.A.P. 29(c)(5), amici certify that no counsel for any party authored
this brief in whole or in part, that no counsel or party made a monetary
contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief, and that
no person other than amici, its members, and its counsel made such a monetary
contribution. The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
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most important here, the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3,
and to enact laws “necessary and proper” to the effective exercise of those powers,
id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
Consistent with that design, the federal government has long addressed
national economic problems that state legislation could not solve or, worse,
exacerbated.

As the Nation’s economy has become increasingly integrated,

moreover, Congress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause authority has naturally
expanded as well.

Today, it is beyond argument that the Commerce Clause

permits Congress to regulate not merely trade between States but also commerce
within States that, on the whole, has sufficient interstate effects.
Perhaps for that reason, Virginia does not challenge the vast bulk of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Nor could it. The Supreme Court has
squarely held that Congress can exercise its Commerce Clause powers to regulate
insurance markets. See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322
U.S. 533, 539 (1944) (“the word ‘commerce’ as used in the Commerce Clause . . .
include[s] a business such as insurance”).

Virginia thus nowhere claims that

Congress exceeded its powers by enacting provisions of the Act that:
 Prohibit insurers from denying coverage of preexisting
conditions. 42 U.S.C § 300gg-3(a).

2
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 Ban insurers from discriminating and denying eligibility based
on health status. Id. § 300gg-4(a).
 Bar insurers from establishing “lifetime limits” or “unreasonable annual limits” on benefits and claims. Id. § 300gg11(a)(1)-(2).
 Prohibit rescission of insurance contracts. Id. § 300gg-12.
 Require insurers to provide a simple coverage summary. Id.
§ 300gg-15(b).
 Require insurers to pay for preventive care. Id. § 300gg-13.
 Require insurers to provide dependent coverage to age 26. Id.
§ 300gg-14(a).
See Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 779 (E.D. Va.
2010) (“The Commonwealth does not appear to challenge the aggregate effect of
the many moving parts of the ACA on interstate commerce.”).
Largely ignoring those and myriad other provisions, Virginia isolates the
minimum-coverage requirement—the so-called “individual mandate”—for challenge. Under that provision, most Americans who otherwise lack health insurance
must, in effect, pay for healthcare in advance by obtaining some minimal level of
essential health coverage—as opposed to seeking to purchase healthcare on the
spot market (or to obtain healthcare without paying for it) later. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 5000A.

Such economic decisions are well within Congress’s authority to

regulate. The decisions of millions of Americans to purchase health insurance
now, or instead take a wait-and-see approach, so profoundly affect interstate

3
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healthcare and health-insurance markets that Congress’s authority to regulate under
the Commerce Clause should be beyond doubt.
The Act’s minimum-coverage requirement is independently supported by
another source of congressional authority: the Necessary and Proper Clause. A
central purpose of the Act is to regulate interstate commerce—to impose certain
terms on health-insurance contracts sold across the country to make them more
readily available. No one disputes that such direct regulation of health-insurance
markets is within Congress’s commerce power. But many of those efforts would,
absent the minimum-coverage requirement, be futile or even counterproductive.
Experience has proved that a system requiring insurers to cover preexisting
conditions, for example, cannot endure if individuals do not have to maintain
insurance when they are healthy:

Too many healthy individuals wait to buy

insurance until they become sick, assured that coverage of any conditions they
developed cannot be denied. Insurance markets thus become dominated by highcost, high-risk purchasers, with fewer healthy insureds to offset the costs.
Premiums skyrocket, and cost pressures drive insurers from the market altogether.
Congress therefore recognized that the minimum-coverage requirement is
“essential ” to key portions of its regulation of interstate insurance markets. 42
U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). From McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 316
(1819), to United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010), the Necessary

4
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and Proper Clause has consistently been interpreted to grant Congress broad
authority to enact legislation appropriate or beneficial to the exercise of its
enumerated powers. In this case, the minimum-coverage requirement satisfies
even the narrowest interpretations of that clause. It is the keystone that prevents
much of the Act’s otherwise indisputably valid edifice of insurance regulation from
collapsing.
ARGUMENT
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act directly regulates commerce
by regularizing health-insurance contracts and restricting terms like preexistingcondition exclusions and discriminatory pricing. Those regulations, unquestionably within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, would be wholly ineffectual
absent the minimum-coverage requirement challenged here. That requirement is
itself a permissible exercise of Congress’s commerce power.

Moreover, the

Necessary and Proper Clause exists precisely to permit provisions, such as the
minimum-coverage requirement, that Congress reasonably deems necessary and
appropriate to the exercise of its enumerated powers.
I.

The Commerce Clause Was Designed and Has Been Understood To
Empower Congress To Address Problems Requiring National Solutions
The founding generation learned the hard way the disastrous consequences

of denying the national government authority to address issues of common interest.
The focus of the Constitutional Convention was therefore to establish a Congress

5
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with power to legislate for the general interests of the Nation, where the individual
States are incompetent to act, and where individual state legislation may disrupt
national harmony. Plaintiff ’s position here harkens not to the original understanding of the Constitution (much less the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence interpreting it), but to the Articles of Confederation the Constitution replaced.
A.

The Commerce Clause Was Designed To Afford Congress Broad
Power over National Economic Problems

The Articles of Confederation had left the new Nation adrift in a motley sea
of competing and conflicting state laws, its central government unable to maintain
order. Washington lamented, “I do not conceive we can exist long as a nation,
without having lodged some where a power which will pervade the whole Union in
as energetic a manner, as the authority of the State governments extends over the
several States.” Washington, Letters and Addresses 287 (Viles ed., 1909). As
Madison explained, the Articles had failed because of “[w]ant of concert in matters
where common interest requires it.”

1 Letters and Other Writings of James

Madison 321 (1865). “[W]ant of uniformity” damaged “national dignity, interest,
and revenue” in areas where “concurrence [wa]s necessary” among the States. Id.
at 321-22.

Without a central government capable of establishing uniform

commerce regulations, States enacted protectionist restrictions on “commercial
intercourse with other States,” which in turn “beg[a]t retaliating regulations” not

6
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merely “expensive and vexatious in themselves” but also “destructive of the
general harmony.” Id. at 321.
The absence of a uniform economic policy exacted a heavy toll.

As

Hamilton observed, often “it would be beneficial to all the States to encourage, or
suppress[,] a particular branch of trade, while it would be detrimental to [any] to
attempt it without the concurrence of the rest.”
Hamilton 78 (Syrett ed., 1962).

7 The Papers of Alexander

The risk of non-cooperation meant “the

experiment would probably be left untried” by any State “for fear of a want of that
concurrence.” Id.; see also Levy, Federalism and Collective Action, 45 U. Kan. L.
Rev. 1241, 1258-59 (1997). That fear was well founded. For example, when the
States “needed to enact legislation prohibiting British ships from entering
American harbors” to give the Nation leverage in trade negotiations, Massachusetts
passed a navigation act restricting foreign vessels’ use of its ports. LeBoeuf, The
Economics of Federalism and the Proper Scope of the Federal Commerce Power,
31 San Diego L. Rev. 555, 595-96 (1994). But “most states did nothing,” preferring to take for themselves the “significant amount of trade” Massachusetts’s law
diverted from its shores. Id. Defeated, Massachusetts repealed its legislation. Id.
The Framers thus profoundly understood “the necessity of some general and
permanent system, which should at once embrace all interests, and, by placing the
states upon firm and united ground, enable them effectually to assert their

7
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4 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the

Adoption of the Federal Constitution 254 (Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (statement of
Charles Pinckney). The Constitutional Convention resolved that Congress should
have power “to legislate in all cases for the general interests of the Union, and also
in those to which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the harmony of
the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation.” 2
Records of the Federal Convention 21 (Farrand ed., 1911); see also 1 id. at 21
(Resolution VI of Virginia Plan). The Committee of Detail expanded that principle
into a draft Constitution with enumerated powers, including most notably authority
to “regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
As James Wilson—a Committee of Detail member and later the first Justice
appointed to the Supreme Court—explained, all agreed that federal power
extended to “whatever object of government extends in its operation or effects
beyond the bounds of a particular state.” 2 Elliot, supra, at 399. While that
principle was “sound and satisfactory,” “its application to particular cases would
be accompanied with much difficulty, because, in its application, room must be
allowed for great discretionary latitude of construction of the principle.” Id. “In
order to lessen or remove th[at] difficulty,” Wilson explained, “an enumeration of
particular instances; in which the application of the principle ought to take place,
has been attempted with much industry and care.” Id. Put another way, “the

8

Case: 11-1057

Document: 48-1

Date Filed: 03/07/2011

Page: 16

purpose of enumeration was not to displace the principle but to enact it.” Balkin,
Commerce, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 11 (2010).
Scholars of all stripes thus agree that the commerce power is “best understood in light of the collective action problems that the nation faced under the
Articles of Confederation.” Cooter & Siegel, Collective Action Federalism: A
General Theory of Article I, Section 8, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 115, 165 (2010); see
Calabresi & Terrell, The Number of States and the Economics of American
Federalism, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2011) (“The most compelling argument in
American history for empowering our national government has been the need to
overcome collective action problems.”); Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and
Ideas in the Making of the Constitution 178 (1996); Regan, How to Think About
the Federal Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94
Mich. L. Rev. 554, 555 (1995); Stern, That Commerce Which Concerns More
States Than One, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1335 (1934).
B.

Longstanding Practice and Precedent Confirm Congress’s Broad
Regulatory Authority Under the Commerce Clause

Consistent with that history, the Supreme Court has long held that the
Commerce Clause empowers Congress to address national economic problems
where action by the individual States is ineffective or deleterious, or where
concerted action is otherwise appropriate. That power has proved “ ‘broad enough
to allow for the expansion of the Federal Government’s role,’ ” Comstock, 130 S.
9
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Ct. at 1965, in response to the demands of an increasingly interdependent
economy.
1.

In Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. (22 U.S.) 1 (1824), Chief Justice

Marshall echoed the Constitutional Convention’s resolutions to articulate the
controlling principle.

Upholding Congress’s power to regulate steamboat

navigation on the Hudson River, he explained that the commerce power extends
“to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which
affect the States generally,” excluding only those concerns “completely within a
particular State,” and “which do not affect other States.” Id. at 195.
While Gibbons established federal authority over the “deep streams which
penetrate our country in every direction,” 9 Wheat. at 195, railways eventually
overtook rivers as the dominant means of transportation among the States. It
quickly became apparent that “the requirements of the various state statutes were
conflicting and difficult for the railroads to implement.” McDonald, U.S. Dep’t of
Transp., Fed. R.R. Safety Program, 100 Years of Safer Railroads 1, 6-7 (1993).
Thus, “state governments as well as some segments of the railroad industry began
to urge Federal legislation to provide a workable set of standards.” Id. at 7. When
railroads nonetheless balked at Interstate Commerce Commission regulation of
intrastate rates, the Supreme Court rebuffed their challenges. See The Shreveport
Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 350 (1914). Even if intrastate shipping was not by itself

10
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under Congress’s power, the Court held, Congress “unquestionably” could
“prevent the intrastate operations of [the railroads] from being made a means of
injury to” its regulation of interstate commerce. Id. at 351. In doing so, Congress
was entitled to “take all measures necessary or appropriate to that end.” Id. at 353
(emphasis added).
2.

The Supreme Court’s path has not been unbroken. It has at times

barred Congress from addressing commercial problems the States could not handle
themselves. In Hammer v. Dagenhart, for example, the Court invalidated a federal
prohibition on the interstate movement of goods produced by child labor even
though state efforts to prohibit child labor were undermined by competition from
States with laxer standards. 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918); see also Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 307-10 (1936).
But the Court quickly came to recognize that, given the increasingly
interdependent, national economy, those “Commerce Clause cases artificially had
constrained the authority of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.” United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995); see NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 36 (1937). For example, in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100 (1941), the Court repudiated Hammer and held that Congress could impose
uniform regulations of production to ensure that interstate commerce would not
“be made the instrument of [unfair and disruptive] competition” among the States

11
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“in the distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions.” Id. at
115-17; see Balkin, supra, at 32 (explaining Darby from a collective-action
perspective).
Many decisions of that era recognized the collective-action problem. In
upholding federal unemployment-benefits legislation under Congress’s taxing
power, for example, the Court noted the States’ unwillingness to enact similar
legislation “lest in laying such a toll upon their industries, they would place
themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or
competitors.” Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937).2
A State’s beneficent actions could also unduly drain its coffers, the Court
observed, because “[t]he existence of . . . a system [of old-age benefits] is a bait to
the needy and dependent elsewhere, encouraging them to migrate and seek a haven
of repose. Only a power that is national can serve the interests of all.” Helvering
v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 644 (1937).
The Court similarly recognized the profound impact of intrastate activity on
interstate commerce, reaffirming that federal power extends “to those internal
concerns which affect the States generally” and excludes only matters “completely
____________________________
2

The Court noted that Massachusetts’s unemployment-benefits act by its terms
would “not become operative unless the federal bill became a law, or unless eleven
of [twenty-one listed] states should impose on their employers burdens substantially equivalent.” Steward Mach., 301 U.S. at 588 n.9.
12
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within a particular State” that “do not affect other States.” Gibbons, 9 Wheat. at
195.

“Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately

considered,” the Court held, “if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to
exercise that control.” Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37.
Reflecting that perspective, then-Solicitor General (later Justice) Stanley
Reed explained why increasingly interconnected markets had led to expanded
exercises of federal commerce power: “In a simpler time, when life ordinarily was
limited to community activities, or at most to the boundaries of a single State, the
powers granted to the national government were rarely utilized in such manner as
to affect the daily existence of the citizen.”

Reed, The Constitution and the

Problems of Today, 47 Proc. Va. St. Bar Ass’n 277, 277 (1936). But “[w]ith our
social and economic development, with improvements in transportation and
communication, with broadening boundaries and increasing population, with
industrialization and multiplying world contacts, problems believed to require
further exercise of national powers appeared.” Id. Everyone “must recognize the
desirability of Federal and State legislation of a new type to meet the exigencies of
this modern world.” Id. at 300. That explanation echoed the understanding that
had come to pervade the Nation. See, e.g., Rendezvous with Destiny: Addresses
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and Opinions of Franklin Delano Roosevelt 295 (Hardman ed., 1944) (“The
prosperity of the farmer does have an effect today on the manufacturer in
Pittsburgh. The prosperity of the clothing worker in the City of New York has an
effect on the prosperity of the farmer in Wisconsin, and so it goes. We are
interdependent—we are tied together.”). The Court likewise came to recognize
that, in an integrated economy, even some of the smallest choices—such as a
farmer’s “trivial” consumption of homegrown wheat—can cumulatively have
sufficient repercussions throughout national markets to justify federal regulation.
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942); see Cooter & Siegel, supra, at
160 (explaining that state efforts to combat wheat overproduction “faced
insuperable difficulties” because “holdout” States refused to restrict producers).
3.

In the years since, the Supreme Court has continued to uphold

Congress’s power to protect, promote, and regulate interstate commerce. For
example, Congress may prohibit discrimination in public accommodations, which
restricts interstate travelers’ choices and impedes the free flow of commerce. See
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 300 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241, 252-53 (1964). And it may enact environmental
measures that States, deterred by the prospect of putting their own businesses at a
disadvantage, cannot effectively implement themselves. See Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 281-82 (1981).
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As the Nation has grown from 13 to 50 States, the need for national
solutions has grown. Cooter & Siegel, supra, at 143; Balkin, supra, at 12 n.37.
Massachusetts struggled, and failed, to get 12 other States to follow its lead under
the Articles. See p. 7, supra. Today that number is four-fold. “[A]s the number of
members of a federation increases, the amount of regulation of interstate
commerce and the scope of the federal government’s power over interstate
commerce . . . increase[s] as well.” Calabresi & Terrell, supra, at 16, 21. The
exercise of federal commerce power has thus expanded not merely with our
interconnected economy but also with the need for national solutions to problems
that would otherwise be left unaddressed by individual States—a need the Framers
well understood.
Far from rejecting that understanding, recent Supreme Court decisions
emphasizing the limits of Congress’s commerce powers embrace it. In striking
down a federal prohibition on gun possession near schools, and federal laws
addressing violence against women, the Court has carefully explained that those
provisions bore only the most “attenuated” connection to anything resembling
commerce, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000), and implicated no
barriers to effective individual state action, Lopez, 514 U.S. at 581 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). Those decisions are thus fully consistent with the broad commerce
power the Court has recognized for over two centuries.
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The Act Falls Within the Historical Understanding of Congress’s
Commerce Powers
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act’s reform of healthcare falls

squarely within the scope of Congress’s powers.
A.

The Act Directly Regulates Interstate Commerce

In South-Eastern Underwriters, the Supreme Court expressly upheld
Congress’s regulation of insurance, holding that “the word ‘commerce’ as used in
the Commerce Clause . . . include[s] a business such as insurance.” 322 U.S. at
539; see 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(3). Healthcare insurance is no exception. To the
contrary, its interstate nature is inescapable. “Health insurance and health care
services” now amount to over one-sixth of the U.S. economy.

42 U.S.C.

§ 18091(a)(2)(B). And “[p]rivate health insurance spending . . . pays for medical
supplies, drugs, and equipment that are shipped in interstate commerce.”

Id.

“[M]ost health insurance is sold by national or regional health insurance
companies”; “health insurance is sold in interstate commerce”; and “claims
payments flow through interstate commerce.” Id.
There is thus no serious debate that almost all the Act’s provisions
addressing the terms of health-insurance contracts fall squarely within Congress’s
commerce power. Those provisions do not merely address matters that “substantially affect interstate commerce.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005). They
directly regulate commercial transactions in a nationwide marketplace by
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regularizing the terms on which health insurance is offered. Regulations governing
the “practical aspects of the insurance companies’ methods of doing business”
affect the “[i]nterrelationship, interdependence, and integration of activities in all
the states in which they operate,” the “continuous and indivisible stream of
intercourse among the states composed of collections of premiums, payments of
policy obligations, and the countless documents and communications which are
essential to the negotiation and execution of policy contracts.” South-Eastern
Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 541. The Act simply “prescrib[es] rules for carrying on
that intercourse.” Gibbons, 9 Wheat. at 190.
The Act also regulates in an area where the States cannot always act singly.
Today, most States allow insurance companies to deny “coverage, charge higher
premiums, and/or refuse to cover” preexisting medical conditions. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., Coverage Denied 1 (2009). As a result, many individuals—
including those who most need healthcare—cannot obtain insurance. Id. Yet
pioneering States that require insurers to cover preexisting conditions confront a
grave risk of systemic failure.

Individuals whose health conditions make it

impossible to obtain coverage in other States will be drawn to States with more
protective laws. That, in turn, will drive premiums up. Healthier individuals may
flee. And insurers may abandon the State, leaving residents with fewer choices
and less competition. Indeed, after Kentucky enacted reform, all but two insurers
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(one State-run) abandoned the State. See Kirk, Riding the Bull, 25 J. Health. Pol.
Pol’y & L. 133 (2000); Balkin, supra, at 46. States seeking to resolve the problem
of preexisting conditions thus face overwhelming difficulties if other States do not
follow suit. Only a handful of States have attempted to ban preexisting-condition
exclusions, and only one, Massachusetts, has had anything approaching success.
See p. 28, infra.
The Act, moreover, prevents the “interrupt[ion]” of “the harmony of the
United States” and impediments to interstate commerce that balkanized state
regulation might cause. 2 Farrand, supra, at 21. State-by-State regulation often
imposes real costs on our integrated economy.

Individuals with preexisting

medical conditions, for example, cannot pursue new opportunities in States that
permit insurers to deny them coverage. Such unnecessary and socially detrimental
impediments to interstate migration and commerce are precisely what Congress
has taken steps to redress in the past. See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, tit. I, 110 Stat. 1936, 1939; id.
§ 195(a)(1), 110 Stat. at 1991; cf. Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 300; Heart of Atlanta
Motel, 379 U.S. at 252-53.
B.

The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Falls Within Congress’s
Commerce Power

Refusing to take issue with most of the Act, Virginia “narrowly focuse[s]”
its sights on the minimum-coverage provision. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 779.
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But that narrow focus is Virginia’s undoing. Once one concedes the validity of the
remainder of the Act under the Commerce Clause, the minimum-coverage
requirement’s validity under the Necessary and Proper Clause necessarily follows.
See pp. 23-31, infra.
Moreover, the minimum-coverage requirement itself regulates commerce.
As the United States and various amici have explained, Americans have a choice
about how to finance their healthcare:

They can pay for it in advance by

purchasing insurance, or they can risk trying to pay for it on an as-needed basis.
Cumulatively, those individual choices have an enormous impact on interstate
commerce that dwarfs the decision to grow wheat for personal consumption at
issue in Wickard. In 2008, for example, the “cost of providing uncompensated
care to the uninsured” totaled $43 billion. 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F). “[H]ealth
care providers pass on th[at] cost to private insurers, which pass on the cost” by
charging families higher premiums, “by on average over $1,000 a year.” Id. Other
effects abound:

Doctors “curtail unprofitable services and shorten hours of

service.” Pagán & Pauly, Community-Level Uninsurance and the Unmet Medical
Needs of Insured and Uninsured Adults, 41 Health Serv. Res. 788, 791 (2006).
And “lower revenue streams . . . could even force [providers and hospitals] to
relocate or cease” operating altogether. Id. at 789. Thus, as with the other,
unchallenged provisions of the Act, “Congress had a rational basis for concluding
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that leaving [healthcare-financing decisions by the uninsured] outside federal
control would similarly affect price and market conditions.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 19.
Virginia argues that Congress cannot regulate inactivity—i.e., a citizen’s
choice not to purchase health insurance.

That distinction has no pedigree in

Supreme Court precedent, and harkens to the formalisms the Court has long
rejected. As Wickard explained, “recognition of the relevance of the economic
effects in the application of the Commerce Clause . . . has made the mechanical
application of legal formulas no longer feasible.” 317 U.S. at 123-24. Rather,
“interstate commerce itself is a practical conception,” and so “interferences with
that commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore actual
experience.” Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 41-42. A regulated matter,
“whatever its nature,” can “be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce.” Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125.
The purported activity/inactivity distinction also makes little sense. “Economists accept . . . that some forms of ‘inactivity’ affect economic health as much as
activity does.” Mariner & Annas, Health Insurance Politics in Federal Court, 363
New Eng. J. Med. 1300, 1301 (2010). The Supreme Court recognized that basic
economic principle in Wickard, holding that Congress could validly “restrict . . .
the extent . . . to which one may forestall resort to the market by producing [wheat]
to meet his own needs,” even if it “forc[ed] some farmers into the market to buy
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what they could provide for themselves.” 317 U.S. at 127, 129 (emphasis added).
“Far from being passive and noneconomic, the uninsured consume” billions of
dollars in uncompensated care, “the costs of which are passed through health care
institutions to insured Americans.” Rosenbaum & Gruber, Buying Health Care,
the Individual Mandate, and the Constitution, 363 New Eng. J. Med. 401, 402
(2010).
The minimum-coverage requirement, moreover, falls on the “activity” side
of any activity/inactivity divide. There is virtually no such thing as “inactivity” in
the healthcare market. One cannot opt out of illness, disability, and death. The
requirement thus regulates present “economic and financial decisions about how
and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased”—
whether to pay for healthcare now by buying insurance or to defer payment by
attempting to self-insure.

42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

It

likewise regulates the inevitable future activity of obtaining healthcare, by
requiring advance arrangements that ensure an ability to pay for it. Congress could
certainly enact a statute requiring any individual who obtained healthcare for free
in 2010 to purchase insurance for 2011 or pay a penalty. The requirement here
simply does that without waiting for an instance of non-payment.
Virginia invokes personal-liberty rhetoric to support its activity/inactivity
argument.

But the question here is not whether “other provisions of the
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Constitution—such as the Due Process Clause”—would preclude the regulation.
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. The question is the scope of Congress’s commerce
power. Structural aspects of the Constitution do protect individual liberty. See
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1998) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). But the Court enforces those structural aspects by ensuring that
Congress is acting within its enumerated powers, not by importing substantive dueprocess concerns into the Commerce Clause analysis. Virginia does not frame its
challenge in terms of substantive due process—a theory that not only would be
highly dubious but also would put healthcare reform beyond even state authority.3
Yet invalidating the provision as outside the commerce power would have the
same practical effect, given the States’ inability to address the problem alone.
No one disputes that Congress could achieve the same result here by taxing
all Americans and spending the tax dollars to buy insurance for each American “in
aid of the ‘general welfare.’ ” Cf. Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640-42. It is hard to see
how the minimum-coverage requirement is more damaging to individual liberty.
To the contrary, it cuts out the government middleman and allows individuals, not
____________________________
3

The minimum-coverage requirement violates substantive due process no more
than far more invasive regulations like compulsory vaccination laws. See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Constitutionality of the Affordable Care
Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. (Feb. 2, 2011)
(statement of Professor Charles Fried), http://judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/11-02-02%
20Fried%20Testimony.pdf.
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bureaucrats, to choose their insurance policies. Even if a few individuals might be
able to self-insure reliably, or to live so remotely as to preclude any resort to the
healthcare system, Congress is not required “to legislate with scientific exactitude.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17. It may, “ ‘[w]hen it is necessary in order to prevent
an evil[,] . . . make the law embrace more than the precise thing to be prevented.’ ”
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971). “When Congress decides that
the ‘ “total incidence” ’ of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may
regulate the entire class.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 17 (emphasis added). In the aggregate, when uninsured individuals seek healthcare, they impose an enormous burden
on the healthcare system that “affect[s] price and market conditions” of health
insurance generally. Id. at 19; 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(F); see pp. 19-20, supra.
As a result, “a ‘rational basis’ exists” for concluding that uninsured individuals
“substantially affect interstate commerce.” Raich, 545 U.S. at 22.
III.

The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Is a Necessary and Proper
Means of Effectuating Congress’s Regulation of Health Insurance
The minimum-coverage requirement’s constitutionality is also indepen-

dently supported by the Necessary and Proper Clause. The Necessary and Proper
Clause at the very least allows Congress to enact additional provisions that are
essential to the effective exercise of its enumerated powers. That is precisely what
the minimum-coverage requirement does. It prevents the adverse selection that
would otherwise cause the Act’s unquestionably proper Commerce Clause
23
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regulations—specifically, its prohibitions on discrimination and preexistingcondition exclusions in health-insurance contracts—to collapse. If a provision
needed to protect Congress’s exercise of Commerce Clause authority from selfdestruction is not “necessary and proper,” it is hard to imagine what is.
A.

The Necessary and Proper Clause Grants Congress Broad Powers
To Choose Means That Are Rationally Related to the
Implementation of Its Legitimately Exercised Powers

Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution “grants Congress broad authority,”
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956, to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into Execution” its enumerated powers, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 18.

Congress legitimately exercises that power “when the means chosen,

although themselves not within the granted power, [a]re nevertheless deemed
appropriate aids” rationally related “to the accomplishment of some purpose within
an admitted power of the national government.” Darby, 312 U.S. at 121. Because
the clause “empowers Congress to enact laws in effectuation of its enumerated
powers that are not within its authority to enact in isolation,” necessary-and-proper
legislation in aid of Congress’s commerce power is not even limited “to
regulat[ing] economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”
Raich, 545 U.S. at 37, 39 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
That broad authority reaches back two centuries.

In McCulloch, a

unanimous Court recognized that “a government, entrusted with” enumerated
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powers, “must also be entrusted with ample means for their execution.” 4 Wheat.
at 408. “[N]ecessary,” the Court explained, does not mean “absolutely necessary.”
Id. at 414-15; see also 3 Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United
States § 1243, at 118 (1833); id. § 1240, at 116. “Accordingly, the Necessary and
Proper Clause makes clear that the Constitution’s grants of specific federal
legislative authority are accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are
‘convenient, or useful’ or ‘conducive’ to the authority’s ‘beneficial exercise.’ ”
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956 (quoting McCulloch, 4 Wheat. at 413, 418). The
Necessary and Proper Clause sweeps broadly because the Constitution is “intended
to endure for ages to come, and, consequently [is] to be adapted to the various
crises of human affairs.” McCulloch, 4 Wheat. at 415; see id. at 421.
McCulloch was not written on a blank slate. Hamilton and Madison had
sparred over the meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause as they debated the
constitutionality of the Bank of the United States. To Hamilton, the proper focus
was on “the end to which the measure relates as a mean.” Legislative and Documentary History of the Bank of the United States 99 (Clark & Hall eds., 1832). “If
the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the
measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular
provision of the constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the compass
of the national authority.” Id. Madison took a narrower view, interpreting the
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clause as endowing Congress with power only to provide a “direct and incidental
means” to attain the object of an enumerated power. Id. at 42. In the end,
Hamilton prevailed: “The interpretation given by Mr. Hamilton was substantially
followed by Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch . . . .” The Legal Tender Cases,
79 U.S. 457, 642 (1870) (Chase, C.J., dissenting). Nonetheless, as explained
below, the minimum-coverage provision survives even under Madison’s more
limited interpretation.
B.

The Minimum-Coverage Requirement Comfortably Falls Within
Congress’s Necessary-and-Proper Authority

To be valid under the Necessary and Proper Clause, a statute need only
“constitute[ ] a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. The Constitution
entrusts the choice of means “ ‘primarily . . . to the judgment of Congress.’ ” Id. at
1957. “ ‘If it can be seen that the means adopted are really calculated to attain the
end, the degree of their necessity, the extent to which they conduce to the end, the
closeness of the relationship between the means adopted and the end to be attained,
are matters for congressional determination alone.’ ” Id. (emphasis added).
The minimum-coverage requirement fits comfortably within the Necessary
and Proper Clause as a means of implementing other unquestionably valid
provisions of the Act. There is no dispute that Congress legitimately exercised its
Commerce Clause authority when it enacted provisions preventing insurers from
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imposing preexisting-condition exclusions, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a), or health-status
restrictions, id. § 300gg-4(a).

See pp. 16-17, supra.

The minimum-coverage

requirement is a necessary and proper means of effectuating those regulations.
Indeed, absent the minimum-coverage keystone, those provisions would collapse
under the weight of a massive adverse-selection problem. The minimum-coverage
provision thus is “necessary and proper” even under Madison’s far narrower
interpretation of the clause.
1.

Congress sensibly found that the Act could not achieve its objective of

eliminating preexisting-condition exclusions and other practices Congress deemed
undesirable absent the minimum-coverage requirement.

“[I]f there were no

requirement,” Congress observed, “many individuals would wait to purchase
health insurance until they needed care.” 42 U.S.C. § 18091(a)(2)(I). Insurance
markets would be dominated by the high-cost, high-risk individuals in need of
immediate care.

The impact of that adverse-selection problem is obvious:

Premiums would skyrocket, defeating the very objectives Congress sought to
achieve—making insurance more widely and readily available to the American
public. Congress concluded that the appropriate means of preventing that adverseselection problem, and protecting the prohibitions on preexisting-condition
exclusions and similar requirements, was to require all qualified individuals
(healthy and unhealthy alike) to participate.
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requirement, Congress thus found, is “essential to creating effective health
insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed
issue and do not exclude coverage of preexisting conditions can be sold.” Id.
That “ ‘judgment of Congress,’ ” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957, is not merely
entitled to judicial respect. It is based on unassailable economics. Absent a
mandate, adverse selection drives insurance rates up. See Glied et al., Consider It
Done? The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health Insurance, 26 Health Aff. 1612,
1613 (2007). Indeed, “[f]ive states have tried to undertake reforms . . . without
enacting an individual mandate; those five states are now among the eight states
with the most expensive nongroup health insurance.”

Rosenbaum & Gruber,

supra, at 403. In Washington and Kentucky, insurers fled the market. Kirk, supra,
at 139, 152. By contrast, when Massachusetts coupled its limit on the exclusion of
preexisting conditions with an individual mandate, it substantially ameliorated the
adverse-selection problem.

Chandra, et al., The Importance of the Individual

Mandate—Evidence from Massachusetts, 364 New Eng. J. Med. 293, 295 (2011).
To be necessary and proper, a provision need only “constitute[ ] a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”
Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1956. Here, the minimum-coverage requirement is not
merely “rationally related” to Congress’s exercise of its Commerce Clause
authority. It is critical to many of the Act’s provisions.
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Indeed, the minimum-coverage requirement satisfies any conceivable

interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause.

The requirement easily

survives review whether one requires “a tangible link to commerce,” Comstock,
130 S. Ct. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment), an “ ‘appropriate’ link
between a power conferred by the Constitution and the law enacted by Congress,”
id. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment), an “ ‘ “obvious, simple, and direct
relation” ’ to an exercise of Congress’ enumerated powers,” id. at 1975 n.7
(Thomas, J., dissenting), or, as Madison thought, a “direct and incidental” connection to a constitutional end, Clark & Hall, supra, at 42.
Quite simply, the minimum-coverage requirement is directly necessary to
the efficacy of a comprehensive regulatory scheme otherwise within Congress’s
Commerce Clause authority. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561. While the Supreme
Court has rejected the claim that “Necessary and Proper” legislation “can be no
more than one step removed from a specifically enumerated power,” Comstock,
130 S. Ct. at 1963 (emphasis added); see also id. at 1965-66 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in judgment), the minimum-coverage requirement is only one step
removed:

Without it, many of the Act’s direct regulations of the terms of

insurance in interstate commerce would crater. See pp. 27-28, supra. While courts
should not “ ‘pile inference upon inference’ ” to sustain congressional action under
the Necessary and Proper Clause, Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1963; see also Raich,

29

Case: 11-1057

Document: 48-1

Date Filed: 03/07/2011

Page: 37

545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment), no inference-piling is needed
here. The minimum-coverage requirement is necessary for the non-discrimination
requirements and prohibition against preexisting-condition exclusions—both
proper exercises of core Commerce Clause powers—to function effectively. In
short, it is not “merely possible for a court to think of a rational basis on which
Congress might have perceived an attenuated link between the powers underlying
the [Act’s health-insurance regulations] and the challenged [minimum-coverage]
provision.” Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment). The
“substantial link to Congress’ constitutional powers” is readily apparent. Id.
3.

The Necessary and Proper Clause also obviates any distinction

between regulating activity and inactivity. “[W]here Congress has the authority to
enact a regulation of interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every power needed to
make that regulation effective.’ ” Raich, 545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (emphasis added). There is no room in that standard for a distinction
between compelling and prohibiting conduct.
Historical practice makes clear, moreover, that “individual mandates” are an
accepted, “proper” means of effectuating Congress’s express powers.

In the

earliest days of the Republic, for example, Congress discharged its authority to
“provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,” U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 16, by compelling activity: It mandated militiamen to obtain particular
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arms and supplies. See, e.g., Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 33, § 1, 1 Stat. 271, 271
(requiring each person liable for service to “provide himself with a good musket or
firelock, a sufficient bayonet and belt, two spare flints,” and ammunition); id. § 4, 1
Stat. at 272-73 (horses and uniforms).

Over the years, Congress has also

prohibited inactivity by requiring people to respond truthfully to the census, 13
U.S.C. § 221(a)-(b), report for jury duty, 28 U.S.C. § 1866(g), and register for
selective service, 50 App. U.S.C. § 453. Congress’s long history of compelling
conduct under a wide variety of enumerated powers forecloses any claim that the
purported regulation of inactivity here is not a “proper” adjunct of its commerce
power.
CONCLUSION
The district court’s judgment should be reversed.
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